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THE UNITED STATES AND COMMUNIST CHINA:
THE DILEMMA OF NONRECOGNITION*
We surely cannot deny to any Nation that right whereon our
own government is founded, that everyone may govern itself
according to whatever form it pleases, and change these
forms at its own will.... It accords with our principles
to acknowledge any Government to be rightful which is
formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared.
Jefferson I
International law is that body of rules and principles binding upon
states in their relations with other states. 2 Although there is dispute
as to the applicability of international law to entities other than
states,3 it is clear that states are direct subjects of international
law.4 The sole medium through which a state can act internationally
is its government. 5 Recognition of a government is an acknowledg-
ment that that government is the agent of the state which it purports
to represent. 6 Refusal to recognize a government is pre-eminently
a denial of its claim to act for the state; and when the unrecognized
government is in exclusive control of the apparatus of state, nonrecog-
nition is tantamount to denial of the international personality of the
state itself.7
The United States refuses to recognize the Chinese Communist
government, which is, nevertheless, in firm control of mainland China.
This situation gives rise to the question of whether nonrecognition is
not also a rejection of international law as a system binding upon all
states and governments. On the other hand, does international law
prescribe such conditions precedent to membership in the interna-
*This article was submitted in partial satisfaction of a seminar in In-
ternational Law. The seminar was offered in the Spring semester, 1965 at
the Duquesne University School of Law. The theme of the seminar was
INTERNATIONAL LAW: MYTH OR REALTY.
1. 2 WIGHTMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-69.
2. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 1 (6th ed. 1963).
3. See WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 96-121.
4. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
[1949] I.C.J. Rep. 174.
5. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 400 (2d Cir.
1927).
6. See Alexandrovicus' Estate, 83 N.J. Super. 303, 199 A.2d 662 (1964).
7. See 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 73c (8th ed. 1955).
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tional community as to justify nonrecognition of Communist China?
Or, does the requirement that international law be substantively just
necessitate the selective exclusion of certain governments from the
international community?
There is substantial divergence of opinion as to the nature of recog-
nition. It is regarded by some as a declaration made in fulfillment of
a legal duty. Thus, an entity possessing the requisite elements of a
government has a legal right to be recognized, and foreign states are
legally obligated to grant recognition.8 This theory is rejected by
those who view recognition as essentially political, i.e., within the dis-
cretion of the state. 9 During the nineteenth century the United States
adhered to the Jeffersonian policy of recognizing any government
which was in effective control of a foreign state. 1 0 The Wilson Ad-
ministration departed from this practice by withholding recognition
from revolutionary governments whose policies allegedly violated
international law. Today the United States maintains that recogni-
tion is a political act. 1 Despite sporadic assertions that the sole con-
sideration in granting recognition is national self-interest, 1 2 it ap-
pears that the United States will recognize those governments which
are "(1) in control of the machinery of government; (2) Are not con-
fronted with active resistance within the country, and (3) Are willing
and able to live up to their international commitments."'13 It is this
third criterion which places the United States at variance with the
United Kingdom, whose government does not view willingness to
observe international commitments as a prerequisite to recognition. 14
The United States recognizes the Chinese State and recognizes, as
the government of that State, "the National Government of the Re-
public of China, the seat of which is at Taipei, Formosa,"' 5 and
8. Lauterpacht, Recognition of Governments, The Times (London), Jan.
6, 1950.
9. Kunz, Critical Remarks on Lauterpacht's "Recognition in International
Law," 44 AM. J. INT'L. L. 713 (1950).
10. See WIGHTMAN, supra note 1.
11. Jananese Government v. Commercial Casualty Co., 101 F. Supp. 243,
246 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
12. See address of Secretary Dulles as reported in 39 DEP'T STATE BULL.
989-1022 (1958).
13. Letter From John M. Cabot, Chief of the Division of Caribbean and
Central American Affairs, to Winnall A. Dalton, Dec. 26, 1944, supra note 1
at p. 75.
14. Address by (British) Ambassador Makins, Catholic University of
America, May 13, 1954.
15. Letter From Acting Legal Advisor Tate to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, Nov. 28, 1951, M. S. Dept. of State,
file 793.11/11-2751.
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whose lawful authority extends throughout the territory of China,' 6
including Formosa and the Pescadores. 17 Juridically, then, the United
States regards mainland China, Formosa and the Pescadores as parts
of one state, whose government is the National Government. The
United States Government has dealt (and is dealing) informally with
representatives of the Chinese Communist regime, even to the extent
of publishing an "Agreed Announcement" to facilitate the return of
civilians to their respective countries.18 However, the United States
Government has made it expressly clear that such contacts do not
imply a change in our policy of nonrecognition of the Communist gov-
ernment. 1 9
International courts, applying international law, will take judicial
notice of the recognition or nonrecognition of one government by
another. However, the matter is relevant only as evidence tending to
show the factual existence or non-existence of the government in
question. Recognition or nonrecognition by one or several states is
not determinative of the legal existence of another state or govern-
ment. Even the evidentiary value of recognition is substantially di-
minished when the court finds that the granting or withholding of
recognition is based on policy rather than objective fact. 2 0 Therefore,
in any litigation before an international court, United States non-
recognition of Communist China would be relevant only insofar as it
tended to prove the factual non-existence of the Communist regime
as the effective authority in China. However, as a practical matter, it
is unlikely that the United States will find itself involved in litigation
wherein the status of Communist China is relevant. 2 '
United States nonrecognition will have no effect upon litigation
before domestic courts of foreign states. The fact that the Govern-
ment and judiciary of the United Kingdom refused to recognize the
Mossadegh government and its nationalization decrees did not influ-
ence Italian and Japanese courts in their determinations that the
decrees were valid, such a finding being adverse to British litigants
in those cases. 2 2
16. United States Delegation to the United Nations Release No. 3872,
Dec. 1, 1961.
17. Mutual Defense Treaty With the Republic of China, 6 T.I.A.S. 434,
436-37 (1955).
18. 33 DEPT. STATE BULL. 456 (1955).
19. 30 DEP'T STATE BULL. 950 (1954).
20. Great Britain v. Costa Rica, 1 U.N. Rep. Int. Arb. Awards 369 (1924).
21. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 110
(proposed official draft 1962) .
22. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., [1955] Int'l. L. Rep. 23;
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, (1953] Int'l. L. Rep.
312.
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The state and federal courts of the United States generally hold
that a sovereign state is permitted to bring an action in the courts of
another sovereign state; 23 that a state cannot be sued without its
consent in the courts of another state; 24 and that American courts
will not inquire into the validity of acts of foreign governments, per-
formed in their sovereign capacities within their own territories.2 5
Since a state can act only through its government, an action at law
on behalf of a state must be brought by the government of that state.
American courts have often been faced with questions involving the
standing of litigants who purport to act for foreign states. The gen-
eral rule applied is that any recognized sovereign power not at war
with the United States has access to the courts of the United States
and of several states.2 6 This rule is of no assistance in the case of
China. There is no doubt that China is a recognized sovereign power.
The fundamental issue is the identity of the agent (i.e., government)
of this sovereign power. A long line of decisions have held such ques-
tions to be political rather than judicial,2 T to be answered by the
executive branch of the government, 28 and not subject to judicial
inquiry. 29 The United States Government, through the Department
of State, has determined that the Republic of China, through its
ambassador, is the proper party to bring actions on behalf of the
Chinese State.3 0 There is no evidence of any attempt by the People's
(Communist) Government to avail itself of the courts of the United
States. However, should such an attempt be made, the court would
be bound to deny standing to the People's Government:
A suit on behalf of a foreign state may be maintained in our
courts only after the recognition of its sovereignty and
only by that government which is recognized as its author-
ized government. 3 1
23. The Ship Sapphire v. Napoleon I, 78 U.S. 127 (1871).
24. National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356
(1955).
25. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 855 (2d Cir.
1962).
26. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964).
27. Supra note 5.
28. National City Bank of New York, supra note 24 at 360.
29. The Rogdai, 278 Fed. 294, 296 (N.D. Cal. 1920).
30. Republic of China v. Pang-Tsu Mow, 101 F.Supp. 646 (D.D.C. 1951).
31. The S.S. Denny, 40 F.Supp. 92, 98 (D.C.N.J. 1941). But see, Up-
right v. Mercury Business Machines Co., 13 App.Div.2d 36, 213 N.Y.S.2d 417. De-
fendant contracted with a corporate creature of the unrecognized East Ger-
man Government, which assigned its rights to plaintiff. Held, that defendant
is not relieved of liability merely because of United States nonrecognition of
East Germany. Defendant must further prove that the contract violates public
or national policy.
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The sovereign immunity of a foreign government does not depend
upon its recognition by the forum state, but attaches to every gov-
ernment by virtue of its existence. 3 2 Thus it follows that the Chinese
Communist government is not liable to suit in American courts.
The precise nature, extent, and effects of the act of state doctrine
are subjects of considerable controversy. However, the immediate
question is whether the nonrecognition of Communist China operates
to deprive the acts of the Peking government of validity in American
courts. The answer seems to be yes. In 1930 it was held that the
decrees of the (then unrecognized) Soviet government were not law,
and that acts or decrees, to be regarded as governmental, must pro-
ceed from a recognized authority.8 3 It was admitted, however, that
acts of a purely ministerial nature (such as would be performed by
any government) are valid, though performed by an unrecognized
regime. 34 It was later held that the acts of a government in actual
control of territory have force within such territory and over its
nationals. 3 5 However, this case is distinguishable from the present
Chinese situation in that, at the time of the decision, the United
States recognized no Russian government. A case more nearly in
point is Latvian State Cargo and Passenger S.S. Lines v. McGrath. 3 6
Here the validity of a Soviet decree confiscating property of Latvian
nationals was challenged. Although the U.S.S.R. exercised effective
control over Latvia, and had "incorporated" that country as a Soviet
Socialist Republic, the United States had not recognized the incorpo-
ration, and continued to recognize the existence of the Republic of
Latvia. The court held the Soviet decrees invalid. Of particular im-
portance is the decision in Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank and
Union Trust Co. 37 The Bank of China, chartered under the laws of
the Republic of China, had deposited funds in the Wells Fargo Bank
in San Francisco. Subsequently the Communists overran mainland
China and decreed all assets of the Bank of China to be vested in the
People's Government. Wells Fargo refused to honor the demands for
payment made by the Hong Kong Branch of the original (Nationalist-
supported) Bank, asserting the Communist decree as its defense.
32. Voevodine v. Government of the Commander-in-Chief of Armed
Forces in the South of Russia, 232 App.Div. 204, 249 N.Y.S. 644 (1931).
33. Petrogradsky Mejdunarodyn Kommerchesky Bank v. National City
Bank of New York, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 479 (1930).
34. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 277, 240 (1869).
35. Salimoff v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E.
679 (1933).
36. 188 F.2d 1000 (D.C.Cir. 1951).
37. 104 F.Supp. 59 (N.D.Cal. 1952).
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Judgment was entered for the Hong Kong Branch, the court refusing
to give effect to the Communist decrees.
The case law on recognition as affecting the act of state doctrine
is aptly summarized in the Restatement:
Courts in the United States refuse to give the law of an un-
recognized entity the effect it otherwise would have under
the rules of conflict of laws, except as to rules regarding the
transfer of property localized at the time of transfer in the
territory of the unrecognized entity or regime and belonging
then to a national thereof. 3 8
The foregoing material would indicate that the granting and with-
holding of recognition are legal acts and, as such, produce definable
legal consequences. However, a closer examination of the decisions,
and of the role of the executive branch therein, demonstrates that
recognition and nonrecognition per se are of limited legal effect.
Most of the cases involving the status of a foreign state or govern-
ment, the standing of its agents, or the validity of its laws and
treaties, involve also a communication from the Legal Office of the
State Department to the appropriate court. Such communications
have a direct bearing upon the final adjudication. An interesting
acknowledgment of this fact was made by the Court of Appeals of
Louisiana in Republic of Cuba v. Mayan Lines, S.A. 3 9 The court
enunciated the principle of international law that recognition, once
granted, continues until such time as it is withdrawn or cancelled
and, therefore, the judiciary recognizes the last-recognized govern-
ment of the foreign state (here, Cuba). On this basis it was held that
the Castro government could bring an action in American courts. The
court then admitted, however, that this would not be so if the political
department had determined otherwise.
Even more illustrative is Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A. 4 0 The ship
Bahia de Nipe, which had been privately owned, was nationalized by
the Castro government. While at sea it was seized by anti-Castro
crewmen and brought to Norfolk. Immediately libels were brought
against the ship by American citizens whose property had been taken,
allegedly without just compensation, by the Cuban Government.
Havana immediately requested that the ship be granted immunity
from the jurisdiction of American courts. Pursuant to the Cuban re-
quest, the State Department informed the Justice Department that:
[T]he Department of State recognizes and allows the claim
of the Government of Cuba for immunity of said vessel and
38. Supra note 21 at § 116.
39. 145 So.2d 679 (1962).
40. 197 F.Supp. 710 (E.D.Va. 1961), aff'd 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961).
[Vol. 3: p. 251
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its cargo from the jurisdiction of United States courts. Ac-
cordingly, you are requested to instruct the appropriate
United States attorney to file with the United States District
Court... a suggestion of immunity in this case.4 1
The Secretary of State explained to the Attorney General that "the
prompt release of the vessel is necessary to secure the observance of
the rights and obligations of the United States."' 4 2 Two days prior
to the entry of the Bahia into United States waters, the Cuban Gov-
ernment had released an Eastern Airlines Electra which had been
pirated from Miami to Havana by Castro sympathizers. Explaining
this release, the Cuban authorities said that:
If the Government of the United States guarantees the right
of immunity and sovereignty of the boats and airplanes
belonging to the Cuban people that are seized in our country
and taken to United States territory... the Government of
Cuba will accord reciprocal treatment to American boats
and airplanes that are in a similar situation. 4 3
A supplementary note from the State Department informed the court
that "... heretofore, assurances were given by the United States that
the vessel would be released in the event that the Government of
Cuba declared the vessel to be its property. . .,,44 Referring to the
State Department communications, the court held itself bound "to
give judicial support to that decision."' 4 5 On appeal it was held that
the unequivocal declaration of the State Department "in this matter
affecting our foreign relations, withdraws it from the sphere of
litigation., 46 The Bahia de Nipe was released to the Government of
Cuba.
This practice, termed "judicial deference" 4 7 is not new. The courts
have been decisively influenced by executive policy in cases arising
out of Bolshevik nationalization, German and Soviet occupations of
various European states, and the Cuban expropriation laws. The
41. Letter From the files of the Department of State as quoted in Car-
dozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of
Prerogative of Abdication to Usurper, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461, 466 (1962-63).
42. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F.Supp. 710, 715 (1961).
43. Cuban Government communication as reported in 45 DEP'T STATE BULL.
407-08 (1961).
44. Note From Secretary Rusk to Attorney General Kennedy, Aug. 20,
1961, as reported in Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International
Legal Order 147.
45. Supra note 42 at 726.
46. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24, 26 (4th Cir. 1961).
47. Supra note 41.
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Petrogradsky and Salimoff cases 48 both involved the validity of
governmental acts of the unrecognized Bolshevik regime. In the
former case the law in question was given no effect. In the latter case,
similar legislation was treated as valid. In Salimoff, the State Depart-
ment had informed the court that the United States "is cognizant of
the fact that the Soviet regime is exercising control and power ...
and the Department of State has no disposition to ignore that fact."4 9
In the Latvian State Cargo case,5 0 the Secretary of State determined
the legal status of the Soviet nationalization laws: ". . . [T]he incor-
poration of Latvia by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is not
recognized by the Government of the United States .... [T] he legal-
ity of the so-called nationalization laws and decrees ... has not been
recognized by the Government of the United States."5' The Soviet
decrees were treated as nullities. In State of Netherlands v. Federal
Reserve Bank5 2 the court accepted the State Department determina-
tion that the Nazi-promulgated "laws" for occupied Holland were
void and that the legislative acts of the Dutch Government-in-Exile
were valid. Recently the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit
justified its inquiry into specific Cuban legislation on the grounds
that the State Department had expressed no desire to interfere. 5 3
As regards Communist China, it is well-established that the courts
will render no judgments which will contravene United States foreign
policy:
Both the Nationalist and Peoples Governments have main-
tained and strengthened their positions. Our national policy
toward these governments is now definite. We have taken a
stand adverse to the aims and ambitions of the Peoples Gov-
ernment.... We recognize only the Nationalist Government
as the representative of the State of China.... [T] here co-
exist two governments, in fact, each attempting to further,
in its own way, the interests of the State of China, in the
Bank of China. It is not a proper function of a domestic
court of the United States to attempt to judge which govern-
ment best represents the interests of the Chinese State in
the Bank of China. In this situation, the Court should justly
48. Supra notes 33, 35.
49. Salimoff v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 262 N.Y. 220, 224, 186
N.E. 679, 681 (1933).
50. Latvian State Cargo and Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d
1000 (D.C.Cir. 1951).
51. Id. at 1003.
52. 201 F.2d 455 (2d Cir. 1953).
53. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 858 (2d Cir.
1962).
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accept, as the representative of the Chinese State, that
government which our executive deems best able to further
the mutual interests of China and the United States ...
[T]he motion for summary judgment in favor of the Bank
of China, as controlled by the Nationalist Government, is
granted. 5 4
Much of the law of recognition is thus the product of ad hoc adjudi-
cation, and is therefore more difficult to define or predict.
It is established judicial practice to construe recognition as having
a retroactive effect, i.e., recognition of a government operates to
validate its acts from its inception. 5 5 It does not follow, however,
that United States recognition of Communist China would neces-
sarily validate Peking's acts of state since 1949. 5 6 A recognizing
state can expressly restrict the retroactivity of recognition, as aid
Britain when it recognized the Lublin Government (of Poland),
effective midnight July 5-6, 1945. 5 7 Nor does it follow that United
States recognition of Communist China would imply assent to the
latter's claims to Taiwan, the Pescadores, or nothern India. 58 Also,
the effects of a recognition can be altered or clarified by treaties and
executive agreements; thus the Litvinov Agreement determined the
status of otherwise-justiciable acts of the Soviet Government. 5 9
NONRECOGNITION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
An analysis of the American position vis-a-vis Communist China
reveals that recognition is, at least in part, a legal act. Recognized
governments are generally accorded rights which are denied to un-
recognized regimes. The fact that the adjudication is sometimes
done by the executive, rather than by the judiciary, does not alter
54. Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co., 104
F.Supp. 59, 66 (N.D.Cal. 1952).
55. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); Luther v. Sagor,
[1921] 1 K.B. 456.
56. The People's Government claims existence from October 1, 1949.
2 WIGHTMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 92.
57. See Boguslawski v. Gdynia Amerykie Line, [1950] 1 K.B. 157, af'd.
[1952] 2 All E.R. 470.
58. See Garvin v. Diamond Coal and Coke Co., 278 Pa. 469, 123 Atl.
468 (1924), to the effect that recognition proves nothing as to territorial
jurisdiction, and that such a determination is political.
59. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). For discussions of pos-
sible unilateral adjustments by the United States in the event it should
recognize Communist China, see Dean, 24 Far Eastern Survey 75 (1955) and
33 For.Aff. 360 (1955); see also Wright, The Chinese Recognition Problem,
49 AM.JOUR.INTL.L. 320 (1955).
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the legal character of what is being done. Recognition is, in practice,
a discretionary act. Each government determines what foreign gov-
ernments it will recognize, and likewise determines the prerequisites
for recognition. This gives rise to an anomalous situation. There
exists an international community wherein governmental rights and
duties are, however imperfectly, outlined. Yet what ought to be a
primary right-membership in the international community-seems
not to be a matter of right, but of mere privilege. If a society claims
to be governed by law, and yet operates under conditions whereby
each member is free to decide for himself who the other members
shall be, the claim of a legally-oriented society is shaken, and inter-
national law is but a veil for subtle anarchy.
However, although recognition is a matter of discretion, it is not a
matter of arbitrary discretion. The members of the world community
do not, as a rule, deny recognition to others upon mere whim or nar-
row national self-interest. Nonrecognition is the exception, not the
rule. The nonrecognition of Communist China is a prominent issue
precisely because it is an abnormal situation. The states of the world
could, by abuse of the power to recognize, reduce the international
community to chaos and international law to a sham. But the fact
remains that they have not done so. The absence of a universal and
automatic standard for determining when a government should be
recognized should not cause legal consternation. The standards for
determining negligence are equally uncertain, nonetheless it is decided
every day that defendants were or were not negligent, i.e. that their
conduct was or was not unreasonable under the circumstances.
Similarly, the governmental act of withholding recognition violates
the international legal order only if the act is unreasonable under its
circumstances. Conversely, when the act is reasonable, it is consonant
with international law. To narrow the issue, the nonrecognition of
Communist China by the United States is justified if it is reasonable;
and it is reasonable if (1) the criteria for recognition are reasonable,
and (2) their application to the facts is accurate.
Eleven days after Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the establishment of
the People's Government, Secretary of State Acheson outlined United
States criteria for recognition: the government must control the
country that it claims to control, it must recognize its international
obligations, and it must rule with the acquiesence of its people. 60 In
October, 1949, the Communist regime probably satisfied none of these
tests. However, it is now apparent that the People's Government is in
firm control of nearly all of China and that it rules with the (how-
60. Supra note 56.
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ever unenthusiastic) acquiesence of the Chinese people. The United
States denies recognition to Communist China because, it is alleged,
Communist China refuses to honor its international obligations. 6 1
There are those who assert that willingness to fulfill international
obligations is not a proper test for determining whether or not a
government should be recognized, 6 2 and this view is shared by the
United Kingdom and, apparently, by France.6 3 However, a large
number of states reject the purely objective test, 6 4 and others, who
disclaim the international obligations test do, in fact, apply it. 65
It is not unreasonable to require a government to honor its inter-
national obligations as a prerequisite to its acceptance into the inter-
national community. The requirement is simply an assurance that the
government is willing to obey the law. There is nothing unique about
such a standard. One who violates domestic law is, upon conviction,
deprived of rights which he would otherwise enjoy. An applicant for
naturalization is invariably required to demonstrate a willingness to
support the laws of the state whose citizenship he seeks. The admis-
sion of new members to the United Nations is expressly conditioned
upon their being "peace-loving states" disposed to perform the obli-
gations contained in the Charter.6 6 It is therefore quite reasonable
to require a goverment to demonstrate a willingness to honor its
6bligations to other governments.
The application of this criterion to Communist China leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the Peking regime does qualify for
recognition. Her ideological predilections and international miscon-
duct are ample proof of an unwillingness to honor international obli-
gations:
The Chinese Communist Party, which has led the Chinese
Revolution to victory, is armed with Marxism; this is epi-
tomized in the famous words of Mao Tse-tung: The integra-
61. Statement by Ambassador Stevenson, United States Delegation to
the United Nations Release No. 3872, Dec. 1, 1961.
62. Supra note 8.
63. Statement Concerning China by General Charles DeGaulle, Jan. 31,
1964, French Press and Information Services Release No. 201 A.
64. STEINER, COMMUNIST CHINA IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 443-450.
65. India claims to apply only objective standards. The Representation
of China in the United Nations, (Indian) Ministry of External Affairs, MEA
11 (1959). However, the Indian Government has indicated a determination
to depart from strict objectivity in the event that Southern Rhodesia declares
its independence. Statement by His Excellency Sardar Swaran Singh, Minister
of External Affairs of India, in the General Assembly on December 14, 1964,
Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations (1964).
66. U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para 1.
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tion of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the
concrete practice of the Chinese Revolution. 6 7
Marxism views the state as a superstructural extension of the pre-
vailing economic mode of production, 68 existing solely to perpetuate
that economic system. The Marxist-Leninist goal of the destruction
of capitalism necessarily involves the destruction of the "capitalist
states." Such ideology can acknowledge no rights in capitalist states:
The Chinese people have always considered their revolution
as part of the world socialist revolution .... 69
All revolutionary people can never abandon the truth that
all political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.7 0
The vanguard of the proletariat will remain unconquerable
in all circumstances only if it masters all forms of struggle
-peaceful and armed.., legal and illegal. 7 1
Communist China's international behavior substantiates her philo-
sophical commitment to violence and disorder. The General Assembly
of the United Nations has condemned Communist Chinese aggression
in Korea, 7 2 and declared Peking's treatment of military and civilian
prisoners to be "atrocious" and "in violation of rules of international
law and basic standards of conduct and morality and as affronting
human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person." 7 3 In
1959, the General Assembly went on record as deploring the suppres-
sion of the Tibetan people by the Chinese Communists, and a special
committee of the International Commission of Jurists found that the
Peking regime had committed acts of genocide in Tibet. 7 4 Upon
gaining control of the mainland, the Communists seized all United
States consular property in Peking, in direct violation of the Sino-
American Treaty of 1943. 7 5 The more recent international adven-
tures of the Communist government need no elaboration.
67. People's Daily (Peking), Oct. 1, 1959.
68. See MARX AND ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO; LICHTHEIM,
MARXISM; LENIN, IMPERIALISM: THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM.
69. Statement by Foreign Minister Chen Yi, New- China News Agency,
Oct. 3, 1959.
70. People's Daily (Peking), Dec. 10, 1961.
71. Letter From The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, June 14, 1963,
reported in HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
THE CONDUCT OF COMMUNIST CHINA. 5 (Comm. Print 1963).
72. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 71 at 1.
73. Id. at 10.
74. Id. at 7.
75. Id. at 9.
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Since the criteria for recognition used by the United States are
reasonable, and their application to the Chinese status quo is accur-
ate, it follows that United States nonrecognition of Communist
China is reasonable. In view of the absence of a universal legal stand-
ard for recognition, the position of the United States is consistent
with those international legal principles which do exist. Nevertheless,
the Chinese recognition problem accentuates the deficiencies of the
international legal order: to the extent that the rights of any state or
government depend upon the discretion of another state, a fundamen-
tal premise of any legal system--equality before the law-is absent.
On the other hand, the policy of extending recognition to any
group exercising political control, without regard to its attitude
toward the rights of others, does violence to international law. The
deleterious consequences of indiscriminate recognition are evident in
the Sabbatino case.7 6 Here the Cuban Government invoked its status
as a recognized sovereign to gain access to the courts of the United
States, whereupon it pursued its claims to property (formerly owned
by American citizens) acquired by the Cuban State through an ex-
propriation decree which was manifestly contrary to international
law (in that the property was taken without just compensation). The
United States Supreme Court held that, as the expropriation decree
was a Cuban act of state, it could not be questioned in a foreign court,
notwithstanding its patent illegality. Thus the premise that all gov-
ernments are entitled to recognition can be a convenient device, in the
hands of unscrupulous governments, to obtain judicial approbation
for the most flagrant violations of international law.
If the United States were to abandon its present position and recog-
nize Communist China, there would follow an almost universal ac-
knowledgment of the right of all states and governments to be treated
as such. However, as Sabbatino demonstrates, such deference to
formal rules often operates to subvert the substance of international
law. Ultimately, then, the Chinese recognition problem presents, not
a choice between legal principle and political policy, but a choice
between conflicting demands of international law. The United States
has chosen to preserve substantive international law to the detri-
ment of procedural international law. So long as Communist China
remains ideologically and politically committed to international chaos,
the recognition dilemma is insoluble.
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